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answers to these kinds of questions about how resources are manufactured, distributed, and exchanged 
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One recent December, the first author came close to causing a new level of warfare between his 
daughters. The event began innocently enough. He was in the “Awesome Dad” mode, about to hand our 
chocolate caramels to his kids, both under the age of 10. The chocolates were wrapped in festive colors—
red and green—and shaped like Christmas ornaments. The color of the wrapper made no difference in 
taste (as confirmed by Geoff’s “randomly controlled taste tests”). Pulling them out of the bag, Geoff 
could almost anticipate the competition that was about to erupt over the single green chocolate, yet the 
experimentalist in him let the scene play out. Each child was quick to make her appeal for why she should 
get the green one, complete with accusations of favoritism (“But you have her the special treat last time”), 
victimization (“You don’t care about me”), and deprivation (“I never even got to try the green one”). 
Even after being warned that continuing to protest would mean no one would receive any chocolate, they 
continued unabated. Each child would rather have no chocolate than let her sister receive the more 
attractive one. 
 As we soon conclude, we argue that these behaviors, exhibited over chocolates by children whose 
behaviors appear irrational, can (a) manifest over real economic outcomes, (b) with adults, and (c) 
originate from a meaningful, regularly occurring, and rational intention: the search for security. As a 
complement to other chapters in this handbook, this chapter’s initial focus is about understanding security 
concerns in interdependent economic decision-making, that is, contexts wherein individuals are asked 
with distributing resources between two or more parties, typically themselves and another. The economics 
component of economic decision-making concerns the manufacturing, distribution, and exchange of 
resources, whether money or ornament-shaped chocolates. The decision-making component involves 
applying psychological principles, such as motivation, to understanding how individuals choose among 
alternatives. For these reasons, it is a topic that falls under the study of behavioral economics (Camerer & 
Loewenstein, 2004; De Cremer, Zeelenberg, & Murnighan, 2006). 
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 It is the interdependent component of economic decision-making, however, that helps us 
investigate individuals' intentions to cooperate or compete, to explore self-interest and its manifestation in 
individuals' treatment (or lack thereof) of other parties. This intersection of topics allows us to answer the 
types of questions raised by examples like the one described above, such as, "Why might someone 
sacrifice her own absolute gains simply to avoid receiving less than someone else?" Understanding the 
answers to these kinds of questions about how resources are manufactured, distributed, and exchanged is 
a topic with great ramifications for, among other things, domestic and international politics (e.g., 
Lancaster, 2007; Waltz, 1979), the funding of research disciplines or functional areas within 
organizations, deal-making and dispute resolution, and basic survival functions, through the sharing of 
food, shelter, and other basic resources (e.g., Boyd & Silk, 2012; Hill, 2002). 
 We focus on something emblematic about the motivations exhibited in the above example: Geoff 
thought his daughters would be most concerned with absolute value (whether or not they received a 
chocolate), but they were also concerned with relative value (avoiding getting the "worse" chocolate than 
the other child) This concern with relative economic value is regularly demonstrated and well established 
(e.g., Messick & Thorngate, 1967; Stouffer, Schuman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). That said, it is 
not readily apparent how to reconcile a focus on relative outcomes—at sacrifice to one's own absolute 
outcomes—with existing theories about self-interest. The lens of economics theory (Mill, 1874/1968; 
Smith, 1776/1863) would consider the sacrifice of absolute in favor of relative outcomes irrational and 
non-normative, and existing psychological theories on self-interest (Deutsch, 1973; Kelley, Beckman, & 
Fischer, 1967; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) would also find these outcome preferences difficult to explain. 
 However, based on our recent research (Gu, Bohm, & Leonardelli, 2013), we argue that such 
behavior is in many cases a natural manifestation of self-interest depending on how individuals 
conceptualize self-interest within their self-regulatory system. Specifically, we conclude that while a 
focus on absolute outcomes occurs when people pursue their interests by focusing on opportunity and 
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advancement, a focus on relative outcomes occurs when people pursue their interests by focusing on 
safety and security (Higgins, 1997).We begin by reviewing our theoretical approach to security, 
originating from regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), and then review the economic decision-making 
literature on relative outcomes and discuss our research. Finally, we offer implications for how security 
seeking can affect different kinds of economic decision-snaking. In so doing, we also address how 
consequences are shaped by whether security seeking originates from community-level events. 
A Regulatory Focus Approach to Understanding Security 
 Our perspective on how security motivation shapes interdependent economic decision-making 
originates from regulatory focus theory, which describes how individuals can take different means to 
approaching desired end states (Higgins, 1997; for a recent review, see Scholer &. Higgins, 2011). A 
promotion focus refers to individuals approaching desired ends by pursuing their ideals, wishes, and 
aspirations, that is, by focusing on growth, nurturance, and achievement of positive outcomes. By 
contrast, a prevention focus refers to individuals approaching desired ends by pursuing their oughts, 
duties, and obligations, that is, by focusing on safety, security, and the prevention of negative outcomes. 
Although everyone values both advancement and security, in some situations security is emphasized more 
than advancement, and vice versa. For example, an individual is more likely to be concerned with safety, 
and therefore more likely to be in a prevention focus, when crossing a busy street. However, the same 
person would be more likely to be concerned with opportunity, and therefore more likely to be in a 
promotion focus, when buying a lottery ticket. In addition to situations that are more or less likely to 
induce a promotion or prevention focus, individuals can be chronically more promotion or prevention 
focused. 
 Regulatory focus has been connected to a variety of outcomes. Early research connected it to 
different emotional experiences (Higgins, 1987) as well as different means for goal attainment (e.g., 
Forster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998; Forster, Liberman, & Higgins, 9005; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). 
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More recently, it has been demonstrated that regulatory focus affects such diverse outcomes as decision-
making (e.g., Brockner, Paruchuri, Idson, & Higgins, 9009; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, 
Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010), self-evaluation (e.g., Leonardelli & Lakin, 2010; Leonardelli, Lakin, & 
Arkin, 2007), close relationships (e.g., Bohns & Higgins, 2011; Bohns et al., 2013; Molden, Lucas, 
Finkely, Kumashiro, 8c Rusbult, 2009; Righetti, Rusbult, & Finkenauer, 2010), group processes (e.g., 
Faddegon, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2009; Faddegon, Scheepers, & Elleniers, 2008), and intergroup 
dynamics (e.g., Sassenberg & Woltin, 2008; Shah, Brazy, & Higgins, 2004; Trawalter & Richeson, 2006). 
 More importantly, for our purposes, regulatory focus has been shown to predict individuals' 
behavior in interdependent economic decision-making tasks (see Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & 
Mussweiler, 2005; more recently, Appelt & Higgins, 2010; Shalvi et al., 2013). Galinsky et al. (2005) 
found that negotiators with a promotion focus yielded better outcomes for themselves and greater joint 
gain than did negotiators with a prevention focus. Given the existing theories of self-interest in the 
negotiations literature, it may be tempting to conclude from Galinsky et al.'s (2005) data that, relative to a 
promotion focus, a prevention focus leads to a lower level of self-interest (Kelley et al., 1967) or a greater 
prosocial orientation (Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). However, we have argued instead that 
individuals in a promotion focus and individuals in a prevention focus simply manifest their self-interest 
in different ways (Go et al., 2013). While individuals in a promotion focus are more likely to exhibit the 
traditional form of self-interest described earlier, that is, a concern with absolute gain or maximizing the 
best possible outcome, individuals in a prevention focus are more likely to exhibit a concern with relative 
Outcomes, or the difference between their outcomes and those of the other party. 
The Difficulty of Explaining Relative Outcomes 
Our general thesis is that the preferential regulation of relative outcomes is rooted in a rational 
pursuit of self-interest. Yet, for the most part, existing theories on self-interest cannot readily explain how 
sacrificing absolute value for the sake of relative gain could be considered a self-interested act. To be 
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sure, a focus on relative outcomes is a well-established phenomenon. As far back as Stouffer's work on 
relative deprivation (Stouffer et al., 1949) and Messick and Thorngate's (1967) demonstration of "relative 
gain," which we elaborate on later, we have seen repeated demonstrations of people exhibiting a focus on 
relative outcomes (e.g., Crosby, 1976; De Dreu & van Lange, 1995; Eek & Garling, 2006; Knight & 
Dubro, 1984; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Pilluda & 
Murnighan, 1996; Schulz & May, 1989; Snidal, 1991; Tajfel, Billing, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Relative 
outcomes matter, and they have implications for our interactions with close others, business partners, 
subordinates, group processes, and intergroup relations. However, to our knowledge, absent from this 
literature is an explanation that offers a rationalist account for individuals' preference for relative 
outcomes. Our research fills this gap by offering a self-interest account of individuals' preferences for 
relative compared to absolute outcomes. 
Psychological Explanations of Self-Interest 
The concept of self-interest as defined by psychologists has gradually evolved to incorporate 
forms of self-interest that extend beyond the limited definition of self-interest focused on maximizing 
personal absolute outcomes. However, even with this more nuanced understanding, it is still difficult to 
reconcile the pursuit of relative outcomes with existing theory. This evolving conceptualization of self-
interest is perhaps illustrated most strongly by the literature on negotiations (for reviews, see Bazerman, 
Curhan, Moore, &Valley, 2000; Carnevale & De Dreit, 2006; Thompson, 1990). Early negotiations 
research began by investigating individual negotiators' self- interest exploring the conditions under which' 
negotiators would exhibit different levels of aspiration (Hamner & Harnett, 1975; Siegel & Fouraker, 
1960), goals (Locke & Latham, 1990; for a recent review, see Tasa, Whyte, & Leonardelli, 2013), or 
resistance to making concessions (Kelley et al' 1967). Underlying this research was an assumption that 
the higher a negotiator's aspirations were, the less they would concede and the more they would 
accumulate when an agreement was reached. In other words, the basic assumption behind this research 
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was that self-interest would ultimately lead to greater absolute gains, particularly through a resistance to 
concessions. 
 A major development in the negotiations literature was the acknowledgement that, beyond 
personal self-interest, individual negotiators could also at times exhibit a personal self-interest, individual 
negotiations literature was the acknowledgement that, beyond personal self-interest, individual 
negotiators could also at times exhibit a prosocial orientation wherein they sought to benefit both 
themselves and the other party (Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt, 1998; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). According to dual 
concern theory (Pruitt, 1998), negotiators’ motivations differed according to the orthogonal dimensions of 
“concern for self” and “concerns for other.” Knowing where an individual negotiator fell on these two 
dimensions could then inform what strategies they used in the negotiation. For example, a more problem-
solving approach is likely when a negotiator is high in both motives, but a more contentious approach is 
likely when a negotiator is low in concern for the other.  
 These theoretical advances did much to strengthen the explanatory power of self-interest in 
economic decision-making. In spite of such advances, however, this area of research has still not 
addressed the emphasis on relative gains illustrated in our opening example, treating it instead as a 
separate approach to studying its consequences for interdependence behaviors (for a review, see Au & 
Kwong, 2004 and Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 9008; e.g., De Dreu & van Lange, 1995; Karagonlar & 
Kuhlman, 2013; McClintock & Allison, 1989). Geoff's daughters were motivated by neither an absolute 
value orientation nor a prosocial orientation. For evidence of this relative value orientation, we turn to 
another area of research conducted by social psychologists on what we (Cu et al., 2013) have recently 
referred to as "interdependence orientations" and identify some anomalous findings. 
Preferences for Relative Outcomes 
In contrast to the negotiations literature, the interdependence orientations literature initially 
originated from research on experimental games (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Messick & Thorngate, 
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1967), and the topic soon expanded into multiple domains, including those related to intergroup relations 
(Tajfel et al., 1971). One of the methodological advances gained by this literature was a means of 
measuring motivation in game contexts, using what Messick and McClintock called a "decomposed 
game" (researchers have also referred to this type of measure as “payoff matrices” or "allocation 
matrices"). On this measure, individuals evaluate preferences for different types of payoffs to be given to 
their party. Crucially, however, each of these payoffs for their party is yoked to payoffs for another party. 
These decomposed games are specifically designed to distinguish between the different kinds of 
motivational orientations individuals may take in an interdependent context. Consider, for example, a 
choice between giving oneself $10 and another party $12, or oneself $8 and the other party $8. Given 
these options, an individual may not choose solely based on which outcome is best for them; the 
individual may also consider information about the other party's outcome, or, in a break from previous 
literatures, the individual may consider the difference between the two parties' outcomes. (See Figure 14.1 
for an example.) 
INSERT FIGURE 14.1 HERE 
 
 Within this literature, we see substantial evidence pointing to motivational orientations that are 
defined by the differences between outcomes (i.e., relative orientations; Crosby, 1976; Messick & 
Throngate, 1967; Snidal, 1991l; Stouffer et al., 1949; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1975; Waltz, 1979). In 
their review of the interdependence literature, Gu et al. (2013) pointed out that individuals tend to exhibit 
two types of relative orientations. On one hand, individuals may seek equality (i.e., to minimize 
differences in outcomes between themselves and the other party); on the other hand, they may seek 
relative gain (i.e. to maximize the difference between their outcomes beyond what the other party 
receives). Particularly striking, accumulating evidence has demonstrated that individuals at times prefer to 
regulate relative outcomes even if that means their party receives less in terms of absolute value (e.g., 
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Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Messick & Thorngate, 1967; 
Tajfel et al., 1971).  
 These relative orientations could be contrasted to orientations more focused on maximizing 
absolute outcomes, such as self gain (i.e., seeking to maximize outcomes for one's own party only) or 
joint gain (i.e., seeking to maximize outcomes for both parties). Gu et al. (2013) organized the 
orientations as part of a 2 X 2 matrix, with orientations differentiated by economic orientation (absolute, 
relative) and social orientation (prosocial, proself; see Table 14.1). Whereas previous theories in 
economics and psychology typically interpreted these outcome preferences as simply proself or prosocial 
(generally) or self gain or joint gain (specifically), it is more difficult to explain relative orientations using 
the existing theories of self-interest. This is the gap our research sought relative orientations using the 
existing theories of self-interest. This is the gap our research sought to fill we proposed and tested a 
model to predict when individuals would be more likely to pursue relative outcomes as opposed to 
absolute outcomes. Specifically, we have argued that the manner in which individuals pursue their own 
self-interest—with either a primary concern for security and safety or a primary concern for opportunity 
and advancement (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994)—can determine whether they 
are likely to pursue relative or absolute outcomes.  
Relative Outcomes Are Explained by a Security Focus 
We offered the following rationale: in interdependent contexts, absolute and relative outcomes 
offer different kinds of value. Absolute outcomes offer value in the form of increased opportunity: the 
more total resources an individual accumulates, the more opportunities she can access directly through 
her purchasing power. By contrast, the value offered by relative outcomes is largely symbolic, such as 
perceived status relative to others. If there is any tangible benefit, it is likely to occur when individuals 
wish to compete for the same outcome, an event that is possible but probabilistically unlikely.  
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 When an individual is in a promotion focus, and therefore focused on opportunities for 
achievement and growth, she will be more likely to focus on maximizing value to ensure success. 
Consequently, individuals in a promotion focus will be more drawn to outcomes that offer the best chance 
for success. Given that absolute outcomes are usually more useful than relative outcomes, individuals in a 
promotion focus will be more drawn to absolute titan relative outcomes. For example, when choosing 
between the two possible outcomes described earlier, an individual in a promotion focus will likely prefer 
the option of $10 for self and $12 for other over $8 for self and $8 for other, because the first option 
offers greater absolute value. 
INSERT TABLE 14.1 HERE 
 
 By contrast, individuals in a prevention focus pursue desired goals by focusing on and ensuring 
against the possibility of loss. For example, one can secure a house through multiple routes, such as 
locking the doors and windows, setting the alarm, and informing the neighbors of one's absence. If an 
individual is in a prevention focus, she will ensure that all possible routes are secured before leaving. In 
interdependent decisions, a negative relative outcome could put an individual at a disadvantage, and thus 
someone in a prevention focus would be more concerned with relative outcomes than if she were in a 
promotion focus, With respect to the options described earlier, an individual in a prevention focus will 
prefer $8 for self and $8 for other over $10 for self and $12 for other, because the latter option puts her at 
a relative disadvantage. 
 We conducted three studies to test these predictions. The first used measures of interdependence 
orientations and a decomposed-game methodology to assess the different orientations endorsed by 
individuals in a promotion versus a prevention focus. Specifically, participants completed a regulatory 
focus manipulation in which they were randomly assigned to write about their current goals front the lens 
of either a promotion or a prevention focus, and then completed the ring measure (Griesinger & 
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Livingston, 1973; Liebrand, 1984), named such because the payoffs to the self and the other party are 
taken front the perimeter of a circle located in a self—other outcome plane (i.e., a figure where the x-axis 
represents outcomes for the self and the y-axis represents outcomes for the other party) The power of this 
method is that it allows researchers to use participants' responses to identify an extensive series of 
interdependence orientations (MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976; McClintock, 1972), including the four 
orientations of interest in our work (self gain, relative gain, joint gain, and equality), as well as altruism 
(exhibiting outcome preferences that favor the best outcome for the other party, regardless of what 
outcome the participant would receive). As mentioned earlier, previous research revealing that 
prevention-focused individuals negotiate worse outcomes for themselves might suggest that a prevention 
focus leads to a greater concern with or focus on the other party's interests, However, we found no 
evidence to support this possibility. Only 1 out of 184 participants exhibited altruism; the rest of the 
participants exhibited one of the four standard orientations.  
 The data revealed no association between regulatory focus and social orientation; individuals in a 
prevention focus were just as likely to be prosocial or proself as those in a promotion focus. However, 
there was a difference in participants' preferences for relative versus absolute outcomes. Among those 
participants with a prosocial orientation, a prevention focus was more strongly associated with a 
preference for equality (a prosocial concern with relative outcomes), while a promotion focus was more 
strongly associated with joint gain (a prosocial concern with absolute outcomes). Furthermore, among 
those with a proself orientation, a prevention focus was more strongly associated with a preference for 
relative gain, while a promotion focus was more strongly associated with a preference for self gain. 
Giving confidence to our results, in our second study we replicated these findings using a different 
measure (Bornstein et al., 1983) that allowed participants to exhibit multiple orientations simultaneously. 
 Finally, a third study sought to test these predictions behaviorally by putting absolute and relative 
value in direct competition with each other. To do so, we had participants play an ultimatum game (Guth 
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et al., 1982). Typically this game is conducted with two parties, a proposer and a responder. The proposer 
makes an offer to the responder for how a windfall of 810 should be divided between the two parties. The 
responder then decides whether to accept or reject the offer; if accepted, each party receives the proposed 
payout, but if rejected, both parties get nothing. Participants were randomly assigned to either a 
promotion or a prevention focus condition and then placed in the responder role and told that a purported 
proposer had made an offer in which the proposer would receive $9 and the responder would receive $1. 
This offer represented a positive absolute outcome for the responder ($1 is better than nothing) but a 
negative relative outcome ($1 is much less than $9). According to our predictions, a prevention focus 
should lead individuals to reject such offers more than those with a promotion focus do. That's exactly 
what we found: close to 50% of our prevention-focused responders rejected the offer, whereas less than 
20% of our promotion-focused responders rejected it. 
 This study also served to test our predicted mechanism for why regulatory focus would be 
associated with individual preferences for relative versus outcomes. Specifically, we theorized that 
individuals in a prevention focus would be especially concerned with the social status conferred by 
relative outcomes. Status refers to an individual's position or rank relative to others (Go et al., 2013). 
From this point of view, individuals with a prevention focus are not prosocial but instead concerned with 
the social consequences of their decision-making, namely, the degree to which their value or worth 
relative to others is determined by their economic preferences in interdependent decision-making. 
 As mentioned earlier, relative outcomes are believed to reflect the possibility of loss for 
individuals with a prevention focus. For the most part, this will mostly have a symbolic value and could 
therefore be interpreted by individuals in a prevention focus as indexing their social value relative to 
others. From this point of view, an offer in which the responder receives $1 while the proposer receives 
89 would be considered offensive and disrespectful—an indication that the responder has low social 
status. Consistent with this theorizing, the greater tendency for participants in the prevention focus 
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condition to reject the $1 offer was mediated by the extent to which participants in this condition viewed 
the offer as disrespectful. 
 Overall, three studies supported the hypothesis that a prevention focus leads to a greater focus on 
relative outcomes, such as equality and relative gain, than a promotion focus, whereas a promotion focus 
is more concerned with absolute gain. Furthermore, we established that this focus on relative outcomes is 
the result of heightened concerns with social status for those seeking security. Our studies suggest that 
people's self-interested concerns with their own personal security or advancement can predict how they 
prefer to distribute resources between parties. We see a great deal of value in future pursuits building 
from this original research, for example, by situating the manifestation of security seeking and social 
comparison in economic decision-making more broadly. Moreover, we see that the different ways 
security seeking manifests across levels of analysis (via individual differences, community events, or, 
even inure broadly, cultural differences) may also have unique implications for social comparison and 
economic decision-making. Building from Gu et al.'s (2013) contributions, we now flesh out and consider 
sonic of these implications. 
Situating a Security Focus Within Economic Decision-Making 
Much of our theorizing so far has focused on explaining the manifestation of a security focus in 
the context of interdependent decision-making, and we have presented evidence for our theory that 
security concerns manifest as the regulation of relative economic outcomes. The concerns raised by a 
security focus (i.e., the possibility of loss leading to concerns with status or buying power) are inherent in 
sharing resources, occurring even in such trivial and minimal contexts as dividing red and green 
chocolates, suggesting to us that the apparent simplicity of such tasks hides deeper concerns. In the 
following sections, we consider how a prevention focus affects our perception of different types of 
resources, and how we choose to seek and spend our resources in different economic contexts. 
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Security Seeking and Resource Features 
 The type of goods. A striking aspect of our findings is that individuals in a prevention focus are 
willing to sacrifice absolute gains—a $1 windfall in an ultimatum game or an ornament-shaped 
chocolate—to avoid relative disadvantage. The disadvantaged social status conveyed by receiving less 
than another party means that outcomes that represent gains in an absolute sense are in fact interpreted as 
losses by these individuals. Importantly, this concern with status is highlighted in situations like those we 
created in our studies—namely, decisions involving a simultaneous distribution of resources to two or 
more parties. That is, status concerns may not drive all economic decisions made by individuals in a 
prevention focus; rather, status concerns are likely to emerge in situations that allow for this interpretation 
of an absolute gain as a loss through the process of social comparison. Strip away the interdependence of 
the resource decision, and there is no basis for comparison. Hence, there should be a lower concern with 
status. 
 That said, many everyday economic decisions, which on the surface do not appear to be yoked to 
the outcomes of others, continue to have comparative aspects. Economic decisions are typically not based 
in a vacuum. For example, when offered jobs, individuals typically negotiate over their own individual 
salaries but use others' salaries (for similar work) as a basis of social comparison (Mellers, 1982). Others' 
outcomes serve as an important source of information by which to assess one's own outcomes and an 
additional standard by which to index loss. Individuals in a prevention focus may be particularly likely to 
use other people's outcomes as standards to guide their economic decisions, even when these decisions 
are not obviously comparative in nature. This prediction is consistent with recent research on regulatory 
focus theory, which has shown that individuals in a prevention focus seek to maintain the status quo or 
what is normatively appropriate (Zhang, Cornwell, & Higgins, 2014; Zhang, Higgins, & Chen, 2011). 
 Economists have identified certain types of resources for which the assessment of value is 
especially linked to social comparison. Such resources are known as positional goods (Frank, 1985; 
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Hirsch, 2012). For example, salaries and luxury cars are considered to be more positional goods because 
they are valued by comparison to what others have. By contrast, goods such as gas mileage and leisure 
time are considered less positional because they are valued on a more absolute level (Carlsson, 
Johansson-Stemnan, & Martinsson, 2007). In essence, on average, individuals care less about having a car 
that is more gas efficient than others' cars than they do about having a car that is more expensive than 
others' cars. Interestingly, our research suggests that people in a security mindset (a prevention focus) 
may be more concerned with the positional features of a purchase, or positional goods in general, because 
of their emphasis on relative value. Future research would benefit from investigating this prediction more 
rigorously. 
 Value-in-use versus value-in-exchange. Above, we highlighted the specific types of economic 
decisions that support the link between security concerns and a preference for relative over absolute 
value. Here we discuss the specific types of resources that support this link. A crucial distinction, made as 
far back as Smith (1776/1863), is that resources can have "value-in-use" or "value-in-exchange" (see also 
DeVoe & lyengar, 2010). For those resources that have value-in-use, the resource is valued for the 
purpose it serves, whether as a good or service. Oranges and massages are purchased to meet the needs 
for food or for relaxation, respectively. Once that need is met, the item loses its value. By contrast, for 
those resources that have value-in-exchange, the resource is valued for the items and services (other 
resources) for which it can be exchanged. Examples of resources that have value-in-exchange include 
money and airline miles. 
 Gu et al. (2013) previously argued that the link between regulatory focus and interdependence 
orientations is specific to resources with exchange value. For the average individual, the advantages to 
accumulating value-in-use resources are limited. To illustrate, value-in-use is typically interpreted in the 
context of consumption (see also Loewenstein, 1999). For example, a person typically wishes to 
accumulate only the number of oranges needed to meet the need for food rather than to accumulate as 
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many oranges as possible (such accumulation creates other problems, such as storage and decay).There is 
similarly little advantage to accumulating relatively more oranges than another person. Because they will 
soon spoil, any status I acquire from having more oranges than you is likely to be short-lived. However, 
resources that have value-in-exchange can be accumulated indefinitely and bring increasing value. In 
other words, a person who has more oranges simply has more oranges, but a person who has more money 
has more opportunities and greater status. Stated differently, quantity is not the metric by which absolute 
and relative value are assessed for objects valued for their use. Rather, it may be that other features of the 
value-in-use resources are used to index absolute and relative value, such as quality and rarity 
respectively. 
 Of course, such perceptions will depend in substantial part on the circumstances of the individual 
seeking the resource. Resources that are ostensibly considered as valued for their use by consumers could 
in fact be valued in exchange. For example, farmers with orange groves may be more likely to value their 
oranges for their exchange value, as something to be sold, rather than for their value in use. The 
predictions of Cu et al. (2013) apply to resources that would be perceived by the individual as valued in 
exchange. 
 In addition, some resources are not easily categorizable as value-in-use or value-in-exchange. For 
example, knowledge is one such resource, in that it can simultaneously have value-in-use and value-in-
exchange functions. Once an individual knows how to fish, she can catch her own fish (value-in-use), and 
she can use that knowledge to provide a service, such as teaching others how to fish (value-in-exchange). 
Further, research on interdependent decision-making has tended to focus on the distribution of finite 
amounts of resources, but knowledge remains a resource we can continually give to others. It is unclear 
how a security focus might affect the distribution of resources like knowledge, but this could be a 
worthwhile area for future research. Perhaps security seeking will influence the degree to which 
individuals hide knowledge from others (Connelly, Zweig, Webster, & Trougakos, 2012). 
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 Resource acquisition versus distribution. Another intriguing question concerns the function 
served by emphasizing relative outcomes over absolute outcomes in interdependent group contexts. The 
study of interdependence psychology falls against the backdrop of what has been called the cooperation 
problem (West, El Mouden, & Gardner, 2011).The basic notion is this: why is it that people cooperate 
when, knowing that others will cooperate, it is in their best interest to defect? One potential answer to this 
question is that the individuals who choose to cooperate do so because they are focused on relative, rather 
than absolute, outcomes.  
 The regulation of relative outcomes, it has been argued, has played an important role in terms of 
maintaining group cooperation. It has been assumed that humans adapted to an environment wherein 
people lived as foragers (Tooby & Cosmides, 1988). Moreover, big game resources, such as those 
produced from a hunt, were scarce, and foraging groups benefited from sharing these resources, thereby 
greatly reducing the risks of starvation for the entire group (Boyd & Silk, 2012). Foragers who focused on 
their own absolute outcomes without concern for how resources would be distributed among the group 
would have been met with various forms of punishment (Boyd & Silk, 2012; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). 
 In such a hunter-gatherer environment, a focus on advancement and opportunity (a promotion 
focus) may have motivated the acquisition of resources, hence increasing self and joint gain. Conversely, 
a focus on security and safety (a prevention focus) may have motivated a fair distribution of resources, 
while also avoiding one's own relative disadvantage. Certainly, this is quite speculative. However, some 
predictions from this line of theorizing could be tested using modern cooperation games. For example, 
priming people with security concerns may make them less likely to defect in social dilemmas like 
commons and public goods games. 
Wealth and the Pursuit of Security 
A focus on security, as operationalized by a prevention focus, connects to concerns with status 
and relative economic outcomes, and as theorized in the previous section, we propose that a security focus 
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may motivate a greater pursuit of positional relative to non-positional goods and services, because such 
goods and services are believed to indicate greater status. This tendency to pursue goods as a means of 
maintaining relative status is sometimes referred to as "keeping up with the Joneses" (Gali, 1994). 
However, the purchase of positional goods depends in part on the purchasing power of those individuals 
with heightened needs for security. For example, under conditions where resources are not as readily 
available (such as during an economic downturn), a purchase of a luxury vehicle cannot be afforded by 
most people. In such economic contexts, we believe that security concerns may manifest in different 
ways. 
 One possibility is that individuals may be more likely to identify lower-cost positional resources 
that are still able to convey status. For instance, when luxury cars are out of reach (or simply become too 
gauche to parade), certain types of clothing, handbags, and technologies—items that are not too pricey, 
but just pricey enough to indicate status—may become increasingly popular. 
 Another possibility for how people pursue security during tough economic times may be by 
embracing what we call a "Robin Hood ideology." We define such an ideology as the belief (or set of 
beliefs) that those less economically fortunate (the "have-nots") are justified in taking resources through 
whatever means necessary from those believed to be more fortunate (the "haves"). Financial strain, likely 
coupled with perceptions that the existing distribution of wealth is illegitimate, is likely to heighten this 
belief and may lead individuals with low levels of wealth to pursue feelings of security by supporting or 
engaging in illegal activity intended to redistribute wealth in more egalitarian ways. Such beliefs may 
even be precursors to economically motivated robberies and muggings, which may specifically target 
positional goods. Some research has connected perceptions of wealth differences to illegal activity, 
finding that car inspectors were more likely to pass cars that would have failed an emissions test were 
they standard rather than luxury vehicles (Gino & Pierce, 2010). Also suggestive of this linkage is 
evidence indicating that when employees feel they are being treated unfairly (i.e., when their perceived 
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status is threatened), they are more likely to retaliate against the organization to "even the score" 
(Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). In addition to attempting to 
redistribute resources, individuals might also try to undermine others' outcomes to pursue a sense of 
security. For example, research has found that individuals tend to socially undermine someone else (e.g., 
destroy her ability to accomplish more positive outcomes; Duffy, Ganster, & Rigor', 2002) when they are 
envious of this person's achievements or possessions (Duffy, Scott, Shaw,Tepper, & Aquino, 2012).The 
conditions under which this envy and behavior manifest remain to be established, as well as the 
conditions under which security seeking will lead to positional purchasing or what might be considered a 
"Robin Hood"-like redistribution.. Future research will benefit from investigating the extent to which a 
"Robin Hood" ideology is likely to be connected to a security focus, a concern with status, and a focus on 
relative outcomes. 
A Security Focus Across Different Levels of Analysis 
In our research, we have used a particular conceptual definition of security concerns (i.e., a 
prevention focus) to investigate the implications of such concerns for interdependent economic decision-
making. Specifically, we have relied on situational manipulations of regulatory focus, which make 
concerns with either security or growth accessible to experimental participants for brief periods of time. 
However, in everyday life, concerns with security are likely to manifest in a variety of ways, as the 
chapters in this volume highlight. Here we discuss how manifestations of security focus manifest in 
community-level events. 
Satisfaction With Interdependent Choices ("The Grass Is Greener") 
The greater emphasis on relative versus absolute outcomes may also have implications for how regulatory 
focus influences overall satisfaction with interdependent outcomes. In economic interdependence, 
individuals with a prevention focus seek to avoid receiving outcomes that would leave them at a loss. 
What is perceived to be a loss or non-loss--a potential loss of status or power to another party—may be 
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subjective. Consider, for instance, a scenario wherein an individual is presented with a choice between 
five $1 bills or one $5 bill, wherein regardless of the option she chooses, another person will receive the 
remaining outcome. In terms of absolute value, the outcomes are exactly the same ($5). However, an 
individual could still perceive these outcomes as differing in relative value if one were to use different 
evaluation criteria. For example, when using a convenience criterion, it may be considered advantageous 
to receive the $5, as it is less money to carry. Conversely, it may be considered better to receive five $1s, 
as it is easier to purchase items with more exact change. Depending on the evaluation criterion, either 
outcome could be perceived as a loss or non-loss. 
 At the very least, the individual with a prevention focus would be more likely to deliberate over 
how to evaluate such differences. Given that a prevention focus motivates the prevention of any 
possibility of loss, we expect such individuals will identify multiple criteria for determining which 
outcome is better (including the two listed above: easier to carry, exact change). The irony is, such 
deliberation makes both outcomes look like losses to someone in a prevention focus. Consequently, it 
may be difficult for these individuals to feel satisfied because they will always see the disadvantages of 
their own outcomes relative to the other person's; after all, any option is likely to have both advantages 
and disadvantages. Based on previous research, it is possible that such an obsession with upward social 
comparison will result in lower overall satisfaction with the selected alternative. Future research would 
benefit from testing this prediction. 
The Community-Level Effects of Major Security Crises 
A typical means of priming a security focus in our studies is to have participants write a brief 
essay related to security needs. This is called a prevention focus prime. In everyday life, events regularly 
occur that naturalistically result in the same kind of prevention-focused priming: an individual may nearly 
avoid a car accident, see a news story on a burglary in one's neighborhood, or be told by one's doctor to 
take better care of one's health. At times, an event may be so widespread that it primes an entire 
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community with a prevention focus. Relatively recent disasters (as of the writing of this chapter) such as 
9/11 (occurring in 2001) arid Hurricane Katrina (occurring in 2005) are two such events. The constant 
media coverage that typically follows such events may further reinforce this prevention focus prime, 
leading entire communities to behave like the chronically prevention-focused individuals described 
above. This would likely affect those indirectly and, directly affected by such community events. Some 
evidence supports these predictions: Carroll, Arkin, Seidel, and Morris (2009) revealed that traumatized 
hurricane survivors rate security higher than enhancement needs (enhancement needs have previously 
been associated with a promotion focus; Leonardelli et al., 2007). 
 We believe that examining the economic aftermath of such crises could potentially reveal 
interesting links between a security focus and interdependent economic decision-making for example, do 
people engage in more social comparison following a security crisis? As a consequence, do positional 
goods take on a different meaning? Or are tensions between the haves and the have-riots heightened? Are 
leaders who focus on ideals related to equality arid fairness likely to fine better during times of crisis? 
These are interesting questions for future research.  
Conclusion 
The circumstances of ordinary life can easily put someone into a security mindset, or a prevention 
focus: the threat of terrorism, anxieties over a dismal economy, navigation of a dangerous intersection. 
Research we have conducted suggests that such a mindset can have important implications for how 
people think about the distribution of resources between parties. In our studies, individuals in a security 
mindset were concerned more with relative outcomes than those with a promotion focus, and in Study 3 
(see “Relative Outcomes Are Explained by a Security Focus”), such outcomes were motivated by the 
perceived loss of social status. Consequently, rather than seeking to make as much money as possible, 
individuals in a security mindset are likely to be consumed by the possibility that relative economic 
outcomes have implications for themselves, such as social status/worth or buying power. Such a focus can 
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have important practical implications. On one hand, vigilance toward relative outcomes may serve to 
promote ideals of fairness in hard times. On the other hand, concerns with others have more than oneself 
may lead someone in a security focus to sabotage joint gain, causing everyone to receive less. In other 
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Note 
1. Here, we use "relative value" in a strictly social sense, meaning how much an individual is 
gaining or losing relative to another party. “Absolute value” here refers to an individual’s own 
value, although it too can be indexed by changes in an individual’s own economic outcomes from 
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Figure 14.1. This particular example is adapted from Tajfel et al.'s (1971) allocation matrices (Matrix 
Type B; Experiment 2). Participants are instructed to select one column of numbers from the above 
choices available. For anyone wishing to collect data as well as quantify and analyze participants; 
responses to this measure or others, we highly recommend reading the source material on how to properly 
analyze responses. 
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